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Attackers continually innovate and craft attacks that
penetrate existing defenses. New security product
purchasing decisions are key in order to keep orga-
nizations as secure as possible. Current information
available to inform these decisions is often limited to
individual security product detection/blocking rates
for some test set of attacks. Actual security perfor-
mance, however, depends on how a security product
performs in the context of an organization’s existing
security products. Even a security product that tests
well on its own may be completely redundant when
deployed into an existing environment. We propose
a new metric that measures the total security granted
by a combination of security products. Also, this
metric makes the computation of the added benefit
of an additional security product easy. We take the
results of each individual security product parsing a
certain data set and then, take the union of the re-
sults of all security products deployed at that organi-
zation. Our metric is the attacks in this union divided
by the total attacks in the data set or, in other words,
the total detection rate achieved by the whole system.
This metric can be computed using existing evalua-
tion techniques and provides a more accurate overall
picture of the security posture of an organization as
well as a way to measure the real contribution of a
specific security product in the context of other secu-
rity layers.
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1 Introduction
Purchasing decisions for selecting new security solu-
tions currently rely on vendor reputation and support,
price, and a comparison of security product effective-
ness. To gauge security product effectiveness users
have to wade through unstandardized vendor claims,
vendor sponsored evaluations, and other marketing
hype. At best, new security products will be fairly
evaluated by a third party with a particular data set
designed to be representative or by the purchasing
organization with in house data, but without a good
view to establish ground truth. The metrics gener-
ated even by the best current tests fail to measure the
gain of attack detection using the new security prod-
uct with regard to the existing layers of security. This
leaves those making these key purchasing decisions
woefully uninformed as to how each potential secu-
rity solution will actually affect their organization’s
overall security.
We propose a new metric that takes all of an orga-
nization’s layers of security into account and that is
computable with little modification to existing test-
ing techniques. Our idea is to take a set of attacks
and use the different aspects of those attacks to test
appropriate layers and track which attacks are de-
tected by each security product. An attack can be
made up of many components. For example a sin-
gle attack could use a malicious domain, web exploit
code, and a host side trojan. Since different layers of
security often detect an attack based on a single one
of these components, in order to see the true overlap
and total detection of a system we need to identify
which of these components are part of the same at-
tack. By linking the attacks across layers, we can
measure how a set of security products detect attacks
as a whole rather than just measure one layer in a
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void. For example, if an attack has a drive-by down-
load and a malware Windows Portable Executable
file component we can test URL reputation systems
with the drive-by download site data and antivirus
products with the Windows PE file. Additional lay-
ers such as Intrusion Detection Systems or Network
Based Anomaly Detection Systems would be given
other appropriate data from the attack such as net-
work packets for instance. The actual tests are the
same as existing measurements except that the data
sets used are linked instead of selecting a different
set of attacks for each layer such as AV versus IDS
tests. Once the security products are evaluated at
their layer, we can measure the combination of se-
curity products in layers by performing a union of
the sets of attacks detected by each security product
since the same attacks are present in each test. The
percentage of attacks in this union out of the total
number of attacks is our detection rate metric. Us-
ing our metric allows combinations of security prod-
ucts/layers to be more accurately compared, and we
can evaluate a new security product based on how
much it increases this metric for a particular site with
specific layers already in place.
In this paper, we describe our new metric, compar-
ing it to existing measurements, and expanding upon
the benefits that using our metric provides the com-
munity. Our metric more accurately describes typ-
ical modern security infrastructure with its empha-
sis on layers by evaluating attacks as a whole rather
than just individual components of them in isolation.
Also, our metric can be expanded to describe false
positive rates as well as security system redundancy.
Existing measurements that focus on testing security
products of the same type against each other only tell
us which security product is the best when only one
security product is used as an organization’s entire
defense, which is not the typical practice. Our novel
metric, if computed responsibly using good data sets,
can provide the security community with an accu-
rate description of an entire defense in depth security
setup and the real contribution that each product adds
to overall security.
2 Related Work
Previous work in the area of security metrics has of-
ten focused on the need for metrics and describing
the current best metrics widely used. Andrew Jaquith
outlines a number of useful metrics as well as dis-
cusses the need for and how to determine utility of
security metrics in his book [1]. The Center for Inter-
net Security produces a synthesis of standard metrics
and definitions in their CIS Security Metrics report
[6]. Most of their metrics deal with measuring in-
ternal security over time. They do not address how
to measure security products’ effectiveness in rela-
tion to other security products or with a data set with
known ground truth. Our metric begins to fill this
void.
Other companies perform security product evalu-
ations by comparing security products to other secu-
rity products in the same category, such as different
antivirus programs, directly using carefully crafted
data sets. NSS Labs [3] and similar organizations
perform third party security product comparisons by
calculating detection and false positive rates with at-
tack data collected from real networks and honey-
pots. While this is the state of the art in empirical se-
curity product evaluations, it lacks contextual infor-
mation on how security products perform in conjunc-
tion with already deployed security products. These
security product evaluations also do not measure the
total security provided by an organization’s many
layers of defenses.
Research has also been done to find ways to mea-
sure total security for organizations. In [4], the au-
thors describe a model for evaluating network de-
fenses using attack graphs to find the weakest at-
tacker that could likely defeat the defenses. Such
models are abstracted to such a point that while use-
ful for evaluating proper placement of layers of se-
curity they lack the granularity to suggest empiri-
cal measures of the security of a network. On the
other extreme, the authors of [5] suggest that models
and lab tests of security products fail to accurately
represent the real security provided and that clinical
trials of security products are needed. These trials
would measure the differences in security products
deployed to production workstations and networks
across large populations and network settings at great
cost. Our metric represents a good middle ground be-
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tween these approaches. Our metric provides an em-
pirical granular measure of individual security prod-
ucts in context and of total performance of security
layers with reproducible results at a reasonable cost.
3 Experiment Architecture
We now walk through the steps to compute our pro-
posed metric and more carefully define it. We start
with a data set of attacks made up of the data from
each attack that each layer of security products could
use to detect the attack. For example, some common
representations to be archived include source infor-
mation such as URL and IP, network packet captures,
shell code, and Windows PE files. Let A be this set
of attacks. Now test security products on the rep-
resentation of each attack suitable for each security
product. Let Si be the set of attacks that each security
product i detects. For example, a host based antivirus
product tests each Windows PE file and any attacks
it detects are added to its set of detected attacks. A
group of security products then have a total number
of attacks detected. We take this number divided by
the total number of attacks to compute our metric.
This represents the effectiveness of a combination of
security products in detecting attacks, allowing us to
measure the total security of an organization rather
than just individual security products.
A is the set of attacks
N is the set of security products tested
Si is the set of attacks {x|x ∈ A ∧ x detected by





So T is the set of attacks detected by security prod-
ucts in L
All Layer Detection Rate (ALDR) for security
products in L= number of elements in Tnumber of elements in A
The framework of our metric is designed to work
with all traditional measures of a single security
product’s effectiveness not just detection rate. In-
stead of detection rate we can also measure false pos-
itive rate, block rate, logging rate, etc just by chang-
ing the data set to legitimate traffic in the case of false
positive rate or by measuring blocking or logging in-
stead of detection for each security product. This
gives us a broader picture of the effectiveness of a
group of security products.
An important use of our metric is to compare secu-
rity products based on the increased protection they
afford in the context of existing security products.
Answering this useful question now becomes a sim-
ple set difference and a bit of arithmetic. Simply
compute ALDR for the existing security products,
and then compare the ALDR computed for the ex-
isting security products with the new potential secu-
rity product included. Do the same for false positive
rates, blocking rate, and any other useful measure-
ments to get a full picture of the tradeoffs for adding
the security product. Match these with cost of own-
ership data to optimize improvement per cost.
Additionally, our metric is easily modified to mea-
sure the redundancy of layers. Intuitively redun-
dancy to some degree should be valuable. For in-
stance, two layers could detect the same attack in dif-
ferent ways such that an attacker would have to mod-
ify an attack twice to bypass both instead of once to
just bypass a single layer. Measuring redundancy is
as simple as tracking the number of times each attack
is detected instead of just taking the union of the sets.
Numbers like how many attacks are detected at least
twice could be useful. To be most useful, however,
such metrics would have to be calculated only for
detection methods that are unlikely to be bypassed
by similar attack modification which is beyond the
scope of our metric to determine.
4 Benefit
Currently there is no good way to compare the over-
all security posture of two separate organizations’
layers of security. Our metric is the first step to-
wards being able to quantify an organization’s secu-
rity. This would allow compliance with certain stan-
dards to be measured in terms of total security rather
than the deployment of certain classes of security
products. A potentially enormous gap exists between
the detection capabilities of security products even in
the same category. For example, a leading antivirus
vendor with a powerful reputation based system and
dynamic analysis can significantly outperform com-
petitors but current compliance rules make little dis-
tinction. These rules could be changed to require a
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Figure 1: Each layer of security may look at different aspects of each attack, but since the attacks are the
same we can see how each attack might be blocked at different layers.
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certain detection rate on a representative data set as a
compliance standard instead. Using a more holistic
metric like ours with a good representative data set as
a compliance standard would change compliance to
be a step closer to the real goal of making an organi-
zation more secure. Such a compliance change could
raise the security posture of whole industries making
the attackers’ job significantly more difficult.
Using our metric we can measure the contribution
of each security product to the overall detection rate
and false positive rate of an organization’s security
layers. This will show us which security products
are the most vital, but just as importantly, this shows
which are the least useful. Some security products
could turn out to be completely redundant in that they
detect no attacks that the rest of the security layers do
not. In fact, a security product could even be detri-
mental in that it could not detect additional attacks
and it could add new false positives. Additionally,
this metric could be used to find and remove the se-
curity product producing the most unique false posi-
tives.
A major benefit to the industry as a whole is that
with better metrics security product differentiation is
easier and more beneficial. Actual security features
will be required to improve this metric rather than
just marketing hype so companies are incentivized to
improve their security products. Organizations can
tell when a security product is redundant so adding
real specialized security benefit would be in security
vendors’ best interest. This could result in new secu-
rity products that add new layers to current defense in
depth strategies or security products good at detect-
ing evasive or zero day attacks with which current
security products have trouble.
An organization utilizing our metric would reap
significant benefits by being better able to allocate
money towards security products. Having actual
numbers to measure the added benefit a security
product brings would allow an organization to make
the most efficient purchase available to them. With-
out such a metric, an organization is left to depend
upon industry best practices or protect against the lat-
est scare. Using our metric organizations would con-
sistently raise the bar for attackers with every new
purchase and spur the demand for innovative secu-
rity products.
5 Data Sets
Metrics relying on real security product performance
tests require good representative data sets in order for
their application to be useful. Measuring the detec-
tion rate and false positive rate of security products
for attacks on clean data that are rarely if ever seen
will lead to skewed results that fail to represent re-
ality. Proposing new methods of collection or best
practices for data set use is beyond the scope of this
paper, but we want to touch on certain specific issues
that deal with our proposed metric. The data sets be-
ing collected for existing tests of security products’
detection rates and false positive rates are also suit-
able for our metric with only a slight increase in the
data collected. Linking the representation of attacks
across layers will require that data set collection ad-
ditionally classifies with which overall attack to as-
sociate each piece of data with. No additional hon-
eypots or real network data would be required only
some further classification so our data set require-
ments should cost only a small amount more to col-
lect. Obtaining representative data sets remains an
open problem, but our metric can be applied as well
as existing tests with only a slight increase of diffi-
culty due to the cost of adding some additional label-
ing to current data sets.
While harder to collect, data sets that include at-
tacks relying on the human element in security could
allow our metric to give an even more comprehensive
picture of an organization’s security. For example, an
email phishing data set with information on how of-
ten users open attachments or go to websites linked
in the emails associated with phishing attacks could
be useful in designing and measuring new layers of
security. With our metric run on this type of data set
the effectiveness of user education with regards to
phishing attacks could be compared to an email fil-
tering security product. With some creativity a data
set could be collected to allow us to measure social
engineering attacks and compare different controls
or education. The framework for our metric can eas-
ily be expanded to work with all types of attacks pro-
vided a proper data set can be collected.
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6 Methodology
In creating this new metric for looking at layers of
security as a whole, we use the general methodology
proposed by Jaquith in [1]. Jaquith proposes five at-
tributes of a good metric: “consistently measured,”
“cheap to gather,” “expressed as a cardinal number
or percentage,” “expressed using at least one unit
of measure,” and “contextually specific.” Our met-
ric passes all five of these tests for a good metric.
With a good testing infrastructure to reliably test new
data sets, an organization can “consistently measure”
our metric for each security product. Our metric can
be tracked over time against new data sets, and we
can measure which security products hold up well
against newer attacks. Existing testing organizations
already collect similar data sets and to measure using
our metric simply have to link the different aspects of
attacks together across layers such as associating the
attack’s network packets with its Windows PE file or
original phishing email. Since all this data is already
being captured, only some linking and reorganiza-
tion is required so we also pass the “cheap to gather”
test. We certainly meet the third and fourth require-
ment for a good metric as we express it as a percent-
age and our unit of measure is detected attacks. Fi-
nally, we pass the “contextually specific” test since
our metric measures security products in the context
of other security products rather than just in isolation,
which is a clear increase in value compared to exist-
ing metrics. This directly measures security product
effectiveness in context allowing for an organization
to base deployment decisions on our metric.
7 Future Work
Our proposed metric suggests many future areas of
research to explore. We want to perform experi-
ments to measure the benefit of using this metric
compared to existing test frameworks that rely on
testing layers of security separately. Also, exploring
defense in depth strategies that maximize this met-
ric seems promising. We hope to further investigate
how to measure the value of redundancy in regards
to diverse layers to increase the cost to attackers of
evasion techniques. Working with existing organi-
zations to implement our metric in their tests could
greatly improve the accuracy of the value attached to
certain security products being widely deployed to-
day.
In the future, we also hope to expand our frame-
work by adding attack cost information. For exam-
ple, in [2] the authors expand the traditional metric
of accuracy with added cost information such as at-
tack severity. They also suggest varying responses
rather than just naı¨vely blocking any suspicious data
detected. Similarly, we could recalculate our met-
ric with each attack weighted based on severity and
the system’s response. This approach would take the
first steps towards a crucial translation of security
measurements into actual organizational costs as cer-
tain severe attacks could be linked to financial losses.
We want to explore how our metric coupled with de-
tailed cost information could be translated into an
economic measurement providing real return on in-
vestment estimates for security purchases.
8 Conclusions
Our proposed metric updates the tried and true met-
rics of detection rate and false positive rate with the
context of multiple layers of security products. Our
metric provides a more realistic picture than existing
metrics by allowing individual security products to
be measured in the context of other existing layers
of security, which real environments are using. By
comparing the ALDR of the set of security products
with and without the security product to be evaluated
we can measure the contribution of a single security
product in its context such as with the rest of an or-
ganization’s security products. A security product’s
detection rate and false positive rate are important,
but more important is whether the security product is
detecting attacks not easily detected by already de-
ployed security products. This is the key value our
metric provides the community.
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